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This paper reports on a Catchment Modelling Framework (CMF) designed to support 
an Australian pilot of an auction for multiple environmental outcomes – EcoTender. 
The CMF is used to estimate multiple  environmental outcomes including carbon, 
terrestrial biodiversity, aquatic function (water quality and quantity) and saline land 
area. This information was previously unavailable for application to environmental 
markets. This is the first time a market-based policy has been fully integrated from 
desk to field with a Catchment Modelling Framework for the purchase of multiple 
outcomes.  
This framework solves the unknown information problem of linking paddock scale 
landuse and management to catchment-scale environmental outcomes. The 
framework provides the Victorian government with a replicable transparent evidence-
based approach to the procurement of environment outcomes. 
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In Australia over the past five years, the use of market-based approaches has received 
considerable attention from both state and federal government agencies. Most notably 
there has been an allocation of funds to pilot Market Based Instruments (MBI) for the 
environment by the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, funded by 
both the state and federal governments. The National MBI Pilots Program seeks to 
increase Australia's capacity to use MBIs in managing natural resource issues, in 
particular to address the problems of salinity and water quality. 
MBIs attempt to produce relatively more efficient outcomes than traditional 
instruments such as grants and fixed price schemes for the provision of environmental 
services (NMBIWG 2005). They do this by increasing the environmental outcomes 
attainable for a given budget or maintaining a given level of pollution at minimum 
cost.  
One of the key features of MBIs is their ability to deal with asymmetric information 
problems. MBIs such as auctions and cap and trade allow government to implement 
environmental policies where these asymmetric information problems exist. These 
approaches provide incentives for those participating in the environmental market to 
truthfully reveal costs and actions they can undertake to provide environmental 
outcomes cost effectively.  
The implementation of new instruments in the national pilot program highlighted the 
need for new and often missing information linking actions in the landscape to 
environmental outcomes (NMBIWG 2005). There needs to be very good biophysical 
modelling at the farm or paddock level to capture the spatial and temporal nature of 
the problems (Grafton 2005). For example, determining the impact of revegetation by 
a landholder on river flows and saline land area in the catchment. This problem is 
particularly acute for non-point environmental problems, which made up the bulk of 
the pilots that were funded under the national MBI program.  
The Department of Primary Industries, Victoria received funding from the national 
MBI program to pilot an auction (EcoTender) to procure multiple environmental 
outcomes (Eigenraam et al 2006). The project developed an auction for environmental 
goods and a spatial modelling framework, which were successfully applied to two 
sub-catchments in Victoria. 
In this paper we examine the EcoTender pilot auction for multiple environmental 
outcomes – saline land, carbon sequestration, terrestrial biodiversity and aquatic 
function. The pilot was run in two sub-catchments in Victoria, namely the Avon 
Richardson (371,000ha) and Cornella (47,000ha), see Figure 1 below. 26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 




Figure 1. Pilot areas 
 
Catchment selection was based on data availability, the areal extent of any proposed 
land use change, the type of management considered by land managers and a 
requirement that the focus catchment be a priority region as identified by the 
appropriate state and regional authorities. 
EcoTender is a multi-outcome extension of BushTender that focused on one 
environmental outcome, terrestrial biodiversity (Stoneham et al 2003). The basic 
rationale for including several goods in the auction mechanism is twofold.  First, 
environmental goods may be ‘jointly supplied’.  For example if a landholder plants 
trees, this may simultaneously affect carbon sequestration, saline land and aquatic 
function.  Second, since auctions for environmental goods involve site visits, it may 
be more economical to visit each landholder only once in relation to all goods, rather 
than visiting them separately for each good. 
The EcoTender pilot provides several new economic and scientific challenges. Whilst 
EcoTender’s predecessor, BushTender dealt with the asymmetric information 
problem via an auction, the fact that it was a single good meant it was relatively easy 
to implement. The procurement of multiple environmental goods raises several 
additional economic issues, particularly in terms of the revelation of preferences when 
an agency is buying multiple environmental goods and they are jointly produced.   
Scientifically, EcoTender is a more sophisticated policy response than BushTender.  It 
requires the estimation of an ‘environmental production function’ to express 
landholder actions in terms of environmental goods.  This raises issues on how to 
estimate this function and the cost of doing so. The science is further complicated 
because it needs to connect with the increased economic demands for expressing 
preferences. In Section 2 we examine conceptual issues that arise when procuring 
multiple environmental outcomes, specifically joint production and agency 
preferences. This is followed by a discussion of methods to represent and implement 
an environmental production function in Section 3. Finally, we detail how EcoTender 
was implemented in Section 4 and provide results and concluding comments in 
Sections 5 and 6.  26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 




2 Conceptual  Issues 
Auctions have been used in the past to distribute environmental funds. BushTender, 
demonstrated significant cost savings could be achieved when compared to other 
grant based approaches (Stoneham et al. 2003). If correctly applied auctions can help 
to overcome common problems involving asymmetric information – where 
landholders have information about the cost of undertaking an action but this 
information is hidden from the agency that is providing the funds. The agency needs 
both cost information from landholders and information linking landholder actions to 
environmental outcomes (missing information), to allocate funds cost effectively. In 
general, auctions aim to provide private landholders with the incentive to truthfully 
reveal their cost of undertaking specified actions that produce environmental 
outcomes.  
2.1  Single environmental good 
The BushTender pilot focused on the procurement of terrestrial biodiversity benefits, 
for which the “habitat hectare” approach was applied along with other biodiversity-
related information to help solve the missing scientific information problem (Parkes et 
al. 2003). BushTender allocated contracts to the lowest cost bids until the budget was 
exhausted. Figure 2 below depicts a supply curve for terrestrial biodiversity based on 
the habitat hectare approach (x-axis).  
 
 
Figure 2. Supply and Demand of Environmental Outcomes 
In the context of environmental problems, this suggests that markets for some 
environmental goods and services might be created if relevant information is 
discovered and shared between demanders and suppliers of these goods and services. 
On the demand-side of BushTender the need to express preferences was made simpler 
because there was only one good on offer. Further, in order to reduce auction 
transaction costs the metric ‘habitat hectare’ contained preferences determined by 





Budget 26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 





1. During the selection of bids BushTender assumed the willingness to pay 
was greater than the price of the last unit purchased (Pl in Figure 2).  
2.2  Multiple environmental goods 
2.2.1  Joint production  
There is a growing recognition that environmental outcomes are correlated – benefits 
are jointly produced by the same action. For instance, revegetation may jointly 
produce carbon, improvements to water quality and wildlife benefits. Wu and Bogess 
(1999) refer to this as an ecosystem-based approach that recognises the interaction 
between alternative environmental benefits. They show that an efficient fund 
allocation must account for both physical production relationships between 
environmental outcomes and the value of those outcomes. Further, Wu and Skelton-
Groth (2002) developed an empirical model to demonstrate the extent of fund 
misallocation when jointly produced environmental benefits are ignored. 
Inter-linkages in the landscape mean that an action that affects one environmental 
good also has other environmental outcomes which may be positive (in the sense that 
another environmental good is also produced) or negative (another environmental 
good may be depleted).  In this case environmental goods are said to be ‘jointly 
supplied’ such that one action, which has one lump sum cost, produces multiple 
outcomes.   
Where environmental goods are not interlinked in the landscape and can be provided 
separately, an auction for multiple outcomes may still be beneficial to reduce the 
transaction costs of running a number of auctions.  Where goods are not jointly 
supplied we could make separate or isolated decisions about how much of each good 
to procure.  We may allocate an amount that we are willing to spend on procuring 
each type of outcome (separate budgets for each good) and then spend each budget on 
the actions that provide the good for which that particular budget is allocated most 
cost effectively.  This process could be continued for each budget in turn until all 
budgets are exhausted.  With no jointness in supply each budget would be spent on 
procuring actions that provide only the good for which the budget was allocated. 
Multiple environmental outcomes contribute to the difficulty of addressing the 
demand side problems which cannot be dealt with by assigning a separate budget for 
each type of public good. Where joint supply exists, an auction to procure an 
environmental outcome must take account of all jointly supplied environmental 
outcomes in order to maximise the benefits of the bids accepted in the auction, and to 
avoid unnecessarily creating negative environmental benefits. Preferences for each of 
the environmental goods need to be revealed in order to determine the quantum of 
each good to be procured. 
2.2.2 Preferences 
For a given budget Figure 3 below shows the consumption possibilities frontier for 
two environmental goods, terrestrial biodiversity and aquatic function denoted as T 
and A, respectively. Moving along the frontier from left to right decreases the amount 
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of terrestrial biodiversity and increase the amount of aquatic function. The frontier 
represents all possible combinations of bids that can be chosen within the available 
budget. It is analogous to a production possibilities frontier but in this case the agency 
has a budget at its disposal and must select from a set of bids to purchase a 
combination of T and A. Consider points Z1 and Z2, two alternative combinations of 
bids not on the frontier. Z1 is inefficient because the agency could increase the 
amounts of T and A it procures by moving out to the frontier and remaining within 
budget. Whereas Z2 is outside the frontier and contains more bids than the budget 
allows, unless the budget were increased. 
Each selection of bids (landholders) is budget constrained and results in different 
input combinations of land and water to achieve the terrestrial and aquatic outcomes. 
For instance, consider two points on the curve where the agency has $500 budget. 
X – 15 bids – produce TX units of terrestrial biodiversity and AX units of aquatic 
function from – 20 units of land, 30 units of water – at a cost of $500 
Y – 11 bids – produce TY units of terrestrial biodiversity and AY units of aquatic 
function from – 23 units of land, 27 units of water – at a cost of $500 
Moving from point X to point Y on the frontier results in less T and more A, and a 
different selection of bids.  
 
Figure 3. Environmental production possibilities frontier 
It now becomes important for the agency to explicitly determine its relative 
preference for each good.  In Figure 3 indifference curves ICx and ICy reflect two 
possible sets of preferences for terrestrial biodiversity and aquatic function. The 
indifference curves contain different weightings for each of the goods. In order to 
choose bids the agency will have to make decisions such as deciding whether it is 
better to accept a bid that delivers more terrestrial biodiversity and less aquatic 
function or a bid that offers less terrestrial biodiversity and more aquatic function.  In 
making this decision the agency must, either explicitly or implicitly, express a relative 
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For example, consider three bids received in a procurement auction for two 
environmental outcomes, terrestrial biodiversity and aquatic function, bids A, B and C 
as described in Table 1.  The procuring agency has a positive willingness to pay for 
both these environmental outcomes.  Bid A is for $15 and has a score of 15 for 
terrestrial biodiversity and a score of 30 for aquatic function.  Bid B is for $15 and has 
a score of 20 for terrestrial biodiversity and 20 for aquatic function, and bid C is for 
$15 and has a score of 15 for terrestrial biodiversity and 32 for aquatic function. 
Table 1. Three Hypothetical Bids Received in An Auction for Two Goods 
 
Bid A  Bid B  Bid C 
Units of Terrestrial 
Biodiversity (Hha x 
BSS) 
15 20 15 
Units of Aquatic 
Function     (T/ha x 
mm/ha) 
30 20 32 
 Bid Cost ($)  15  15  15 
Comparing the three bids, it is possible to conclude that an agency, whatever it’s 
preferences between the goods and given sufficient budget, would choose to accept 
bid C over bid A.  Doing so enables it to, for the same cost, obtain the same amount of 
terrestrial biodiversity but more aquatic function. However, when deciding whether it 
will accept bid A or bid B, the choice is not as clear because it is not possible to incur 
no additional cost and get more of one good without getting less of another.  Bid A 
has a score of 10 more than bid B for aquatic function, but has a score of 5 less for 
terrestrial biodiversity for the same price.  To determine which bid an agency is better 
off accepting it must decide whether it is willing to trade 5 units of terrestrial 
biodiversity for 10 units of aquatic function.  If an agency chooses to accept bid A 
over bid B, it is willing to trade 1 unit of biodiversity in exchange for 2 units of 
aquatic function. To choose which bid it would prefer to accept an agency must 
determine how much of one good it is willing to trade for another.  
One way an agency may choose to express its preference between the goods to 
simplify the process of ranking bids in order of preference or value for money is to 
apply weights to the scores for each different outcome.  For example, an agency could 
determine that it was willing to trade 1 unit of biodiversity for a minimum of 2.5 units 
of aquatic function.  The agency could simplify the process of choosing between the 
three bids in line with this preference by putting the scores for both goods in terms of 
one of the goods.  Given a unit of biodiversity is worth 2.5 units of aquatic function to 
the agency, the agency could multiply biodiversity scores by 2.5, this product would 
be the biodiversity score in terms of equivalent aquatic function units given the 
agency’s preference, thus comparable to the raw aquatic function scores.  The relative 
sizes of the sums of the product of biodiversity score by 2.5 and the aquatic function 
scores can be used to rank the bids in order of value for money to the agency, as 
shown in Table 2. 26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 





Table 2. Weights Representing Willingness to Trade One Good for Another 
Bid A  Bid B  Bid C   
Weighted Scores  Weighted Scores  Weighted Scores 
Terrestrial Biodiversity  15 x 2.5 =37.5  20 x 2.5 = 50  15 x 2.5 = 37.5 
Aquatic Function  30  20  32 
Total Weighted Benefits in 
equivalent terms* 
67.5 70  69.5 
Cost 15  15  15 
Value for Money (total 
benefits per dollar) 
4.5 4.67  4.63 
Bid Ranking  3  1  2 
If an agency has preferences that lead to a weight of 2.5 being applied to biodiversity 
and a weight of 1 to aquatic function, bid B provides the most value for money, 
followed by bid C, and then bid A. In EcoTender this problem is made more complex 
as there are three public goods and each bid may have a different cost. 
To further complicate the joint production issue and the need for preferences is the 
production of market goods with public goods. Revegetation for environmental 
outcomes also results in sequestration of carbon from the atmosphere, which in some 
circumstances is a market good. For instance if there were an emissions trading 
system for carbon as suggested by  the Emissions Trading Working Group carbon 
would have  market value (IETWG 2005). For the purposes of this pilot it was 
assumed there is a market for carbon and the clearing price for carbon is $12. From 
the agency’s point of view it does not need to consider the tradeoffs between public 
goods and market goods, it simply passes the market goods it obtains on to the market 
for the clearing price. There are efficiency gains to be made in environmental markets 
when there is joint production of both public and private goods – the agency will pay 
less for environmental outcomes when landholders own the right to mitigation of 
carbon (Strappazzon et al 2003). However, those bidding in the auction will need to 
take into account the impact of producing carbon will have on the amount they need 
to bid assuming they are willing to sell their carbon into the market. The agency can 
possibly count on receiving lower bids for the provision of the public goods given 
landholders who are undertaking revegetation will also be receiving money for carbon 
sequestration.  
3  The Environmental Production Function  
Implicit in the above discussion is the fact that the agency can obtain information 
about the way that landholder actions convert to environmental outcomes.  In other 
words, the agency has at its disposal a ‘production function’ for environmental goods.  
Consequences of not knowing the non-point production function include: 
-  only the costs of prospective environmental policies can be determined 
-  because any two policies differ with respect to environmental outcomes as well as 
cost, no conclusions are possible regarding the relative merits of alternative 
policies  26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 




-  it is impossible to calculate a set of management practices or management 
incentives which are truly “best” in terms of the costs of achieving any given level 
of pollution abatement.  
-  non-point incentives and non-point standards are not realistic policy alternatives 
because emissions cannot be monitored or estimated  
The essential feature of a non-point production function is that is allows market based 
instruments to be based upon those factors which determine pollution rather that the 
pollutant itself (Griffin and Bromely 1982). 
The EcoTender pilot required a non-point production function that explained 
landholder actions in terms of environmental outcomes. The environmental outcomes 
needed to be estimated at the catchment-scale and incorporate both their temporal and 
spatial characteristics. Equation (i) below shows the general form of a non-point 
production function which can include inputs such as land, water, labour, landuse, soil 
type location, slope, rainfall etc.  
() ( ) i
N
i
i i i SA logy techno labour water land f c b a EO EBI , , , , ,... , , = =∑      (i) 
where  EBI – environmental benefit index, for sites i = 1 to N  
  EO – environmental outcomes ai, bi, ci,…. for site i.  
  SA – site specific spatial attributes which may include soil type, slope, aspect. 
The production function needs to have the ability to be applied on any of the sites that 
bid in the auction which are generally at the paddock scale within a farming system.  
There are a number of modelling approaches that can be used to represent and 
implement the production function.  These include 
•  Statistical models that require the collection of data at the farm scale (including, 
soil, management, stocking rate, slope, landuse, etc) and relate it to observed 
environmental outcomes. For instance, in a specific area best management 
practices may have been adopted over a period of years and data collected on the 
level of pollution being produced by that area. It may be possible to develop a 
mathematical relationship reflecting the transformation of a change in farm 
practice (adoption of BMP) to a change in pollution. This relationship could be 
used to generalise across other farms within the area to determine the change in 
pollution if additional farms adopted the BMPs. Increasing the number of 
observations increases the explanatory power of the resulting equation however it 
is difficult to find sites that have sufficient data to develop a relationship for both 
changes on site and the environmental outcomes. 
•  Economic models that are generally linear programming models that contain an 
economic objective function (profit maximisation) and equations that reflect the 
transformation of inputs to outputs. In some cases these models include 
environmental impacts such as nutrient runoff, recharge etc which are based on 
generalised equations for farms in the area of interest. Economic models are 
generally used to determine how input and output pricing policies influence 
environmental outcomes. Alternatively economic models can have the 
environmental outputs constrained to determine the shadow price of each unit 
reduced – and thus the cost of reducing/abating pollution.  26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 




•  Simulation models that are a collection of equations that explain how biophysical 
factors of the environment interact with one another. Generally simulation models 
explain plant and animal interactions for a given point in space with weather data 
as a temporal input. These models can vary in their complexity from aggregate 
(catchment) to micro (farm, paddock) level approaches. Simulation models 
generally rely on equations that have either been conceptually derived or 
statistically determined by respective scientific specialisations which can be found 
in published literature. For instance, the “bucket model’ or the “richards equation” 
to explain the movement of water through the soil profile (Broughton 1994, Ross 
1990).  
An important factor influencing the choice of modelling approach is the level of 
disaggregation required to implement the policy. For instance, the policy may be 
operating at the farm, catchment or state (county) scale. Generally more 
disaggregation means better information and policy efficiency but it may also be more 
costly in terms of data requirements, computing, calibration and validation.  
Numerous economic studies (Braden et al 1989, Babcock et al 1997, Just and Antle 
1990, Babcock et al 1996) suggest that targeting or refining spatial information 
increases the economic efficiency of environmental programs. Holding budget 
constant and using information to target areas that have a higher impact result in 
greater environmental outcomes. Alternatively, if technologies and management 
solutions can be identified in high impact areas then the overall cost of achieving a 
given pollution target is lower. However, spatial models that focus on either cost or 
benefits alone will result in efficiency losses – it is the ratio of costs to benefits that is 
important (Babcock et al 1997, Capentier et al 1998). In order to maximise 
environmental outcomes it is important to model the interaction between agricultural 
and environmental policies at a highly disaggregate level - to capture the 
heterogenous nature of the physical environment and the economic behaviour of 
farmers (Just and Antle 1990). 
The EcoTender project assessed changes in environmental outcomes as a result of 
farmers changing land use or management at the paddock scale within their farming 
system. The project did not require an assessment of tradeoffs (optimisation) or any 
economic information because the auction mechanism revealed the price needed to 
procure the outcomes. 
EcoTender required a non-point production function that took inputs at the paddock 
scale and converted them into outputs at both the paddock and catchment scale. In 
many cases the production functions role is limited to the paddock scale and 
sophisticated numerical techniques are used to aggregate the paddock data to the 
catchment scale. For instance, surface water flows from contributing paddocks need 
to be aggregated to determine the rate of water flow within a stream, but the 
production function is operating at the paddock scale.  
Statistical approaches are resource intensive and are generally only applicable to the 
area in which the data is collected are cannot be used to differentiate process 
complexities. Further it is very difficult to source data that includes paddock level 
management, economic information, spatial characteristics and environmental 
outcomes. Under limited circumstances this approach is useful to support conceptual 
modelling but is of little use for implementation in the field.  26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 




Carpentier et al 1998 reported an extensive study combining statistical sampling of 
farm management and economic characteristics that were used to parameterise a 
linear programming model SUSFARM (farm level economic model). Their analysis 
suggested the use of spatial information with adequate technologies and institutions 
can reduce the cost of controlling non-point source pollution. However, they 
acknowledge the approach lacked infra-farm spatial variability, for instance differing 
soil type across a farm and assumes rational profit maximising farmers. Their 
methodology is useful to compare and contrast regulatory approaches and quantify the 
costs of alternative regulatory standards. Their approach demonstrates the importance 
of spatial information to capture the heterogenous nature of non-point pollution but 
the optimisation process is not suitable for linking with market based instruments. 
Simulation models have the ability to operate at a spatial resolution as defined by the 
user. However, they need to be designed with the users needs in mind. For instance 
there are numerous simulation models that operate at a relatively high level of 
disaggregation which are useful for policies that operate at a high level  (Vertessy and 
Bessard, 1999, Zhang et al., 2001, Zhang et al., 2002). For instance highly aggregated 
simulation models can indicate that one third of the land within a catchment 
(watershed) needs to be converted to an alternate use to achieve a catchment scale 
environmental objective, however they cannot differentiate at the paddock scale 
which paddock it is best to undertake the actions on. More detailed simulation models 
enable a higher spatial resolution and provide spatially and temporally explicit 
estimates of catchment dynamics in sufficient detail to assess the trade-off between 
land management strategies and off-site biophysical impacts (Beverly et al 2005). 
4 The  EcoTender  Approach 
EcoTender is a reverse price auction approach to allocating conservation contracts. 
The EcoTender auction has the following design features
2: 
•  First price 
•  Sealed Bid 
•  Single round 
•  Information about Metric Revealed  
The following sections outline how the EcoTender project dealt with the non-point 
production function, how it was used to provide metrics for the environmental 
outcomes and finally how preferences were expressed.  
4.1  The Catchment Modelling Framework 
A key innovation of EcoTender was the development of a non-point production 
function used to score multiple environmental outcomes. In order to achieve this the 
Catchment Modelling Framework (CMF) was developed to estimate multiple 
environmental outcomes and to spatially represent these to potential bidders 
(landholders) and the purchaser (Victorian Government) of these services. 
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The CMF models landholder actions at the scale in which they occur – farm/paddock 
– explicitly accounting for the heterogenous nature of the environmental outcomes. 
This allows the Department to explicitly measure and account for the heterogeneous 
nature of environmental outcomes. As heterogeneity between landholders and sites 
exists it is possible to get more environmental outcomes for a given environmental 
budget as apposed to paying a flat rate and assuming equal environmental benefit.  
This approach also offers the prospect of improving the cost-effectiveness over the 
single dimension auction by maximising the total of environmental benefits per dollar 
spent. It also reduces the costs of providing information about the impact of land-use 
change, thereby reducing transaction costs associated with procuring environmental 
outcomes. For instance rather than running several programs for each environmental 
element (salinity, water quality, etc) a single program can be run purchasing bundles 
saving on contact time with landholders and information gathering to determine the 
relative environmental merit of each site.  
The catchment modelling framework presented here focuses on providing the missing 
information linking on and off-site environmental outcomes with on-site actions on 
private land. The framework has been designed to explicitly model and report the 
joint production of environmental outcomes which links effectively with policy to 
efficiently allocate conservation funds. 
Past modelling approaches have adopted large homogenous land areas assuming the 
environmental outcomes within an area are the same for all landholders. Aggregated 
approaches are not suitable for application to the auction and do not allow for a 
comparison of environmental outcomes at the farm scale (Beverly et al 2005).  
The CMF incorporates a suite of one-dimensional farming systems models into a 
catchment scale framework with modification to account for lateral flow/recharge 
partitioning (see Eigenraam et al 2006, Appendix I for detailed description). The 
CMF consists of an interface and a simulation environment. The interface is used to 
assemble time-series and spatial data sets for use by simulation models, visualisation 
and interpretation of data, and the analysis of simulation outputs. The interface was 
designed to assist in both the pre- and post-processing of spatial and temporal data 
sets.  
The interface is also used to apply rule-based methods to analyse landscape features. 
For instance, remnant native vegetation maps showing current coverage are used to 
assess the spatial significance of alternative revegetation options. Generally, this type 
of analysis is rule based (ie. patch size and shape, connectivity of remnant patches, 
distance from sources of refuge such as river corridors or sources of replenishment 
such as large patches of native vegetation,). In most cases the rules are developed 
based on current understanding of the spatial needs of relevant species and coded into 
the interface for application in different catchments. The interface was developed 
using MATLAB (commercially available software) and can be distributed as an 
executable to non-technical users and stakeholders. 
The simulation environment is an assemblage of one-dimensional farming systems 
models capable of simulating pasture, crop and trees (Beverly et al 2006). The 
farming system models are explicitly linked to a fully distributed 3-dimensional 
groundwater model. The simulation environment has been designed to produce scripts 
that automate the process of employing third party software, MODFLOW. The CMF 
simulates daily soil/water/plant interactions, overland water flow processes, soil loss, 26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 




carbon sequestration and water contribution to stream flow from both lateral flow 
(overland flow and interflow) and groundwater discharge (base flow to stream). The 
agronomic models can be applied to any combination of soil type, climate, 
topography and land practice. Using the interface, outputs from these simulations can 
be compiled for visualisation, interpretation and interrogation. 
The CMF develops both a surface element network and a groundwater mesh based on 
unique combinations of spatial data layers.  Typically the spatial data necessary to 
derive the surface element network includes soil, topography, landuse and climate. 
The groundwater model requires spatial data pertaining to aquifer stratigraphy such as 
the elevations of the top and basement of each aquifer, spatially varying aquifer 
properties and river/drainage cadastral information.  Additional data includes time-
series records of stream flow, groundwater hydrograph, groundwater pumping, and 
irrigation. 
Outputs from the model can be characterised based on scale as either specific to the 
management scale (paddock/farm) or the sub-catchment to catchment scale. 
Simulations predict soil/water/plant interactions on a daily basis providing a 
comprehensive range of time-series outputs for each surface element.  These include:  
•  complete water/soil balance (soil moisture, soil evaporation, transpiration, deep 
drainage, runoff, erosion),  
•  vegetation dynamics (crop/plantation yield, forest stem diameter, forest density, 
carbon accumulation). 
At the sub-catchment to catchment scale outputs include: 
•  stream dynamics (water quantity and salt loads); 
•  groundwater dynamics (depth to watertable, aquifer interactions, groundwater 
discharge to land surface and stream). 
The following section outlines how the CMF is used for the development and 
application of environmental outcomes adopted in the pilot study. 
4.2  Estimating environmental outcomes 
Modelled outputs from the CMF need to be presented so purchasers (in this case the 
State government) can express their preferences for different quantities of 
environmental outcomes. Such investment decisions are often further complicated by 
the need to compare a range of actions across broad landscapes and different 
ecosystem types that may produce varying amounts of different outcomes of 
dissimilar intrinsic value. 
The EcoTender pilot uses an information framework that defines each environmental  
“outcome” in terms of ‘service’ or the change in the level of function resulting from 
the landholder actions and the ‘significance’ of the change.  
To estimate the change in level of function, it is necessary to have a standard 
reference point against which change is measured. Adapting the policy approach 
applied in Victoria for assessing conservation status of biodiversity assets (NRE 
2002), it was decided to use pre-1750 as the “natural benchmark” against which 
current ecosystem function and change in function arising from landholder 
management actions in the catchment can be assessed. Under such an approach, the 26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 




pre-1750 landscape is modelled using the assumed pre-European settlement 
vegetation types to provide an understanding of native vegetation cover both current 
and prior to clearing. The current and pre-1750 modelled landscapes can then be used 
to measure changes in landscape function resulting from landholder interventions 
based on a progression towards 1750. In this context, the pre-1750 “function” is not a 
target but simply a reference point for measuring change. The pre-1750 benchmark 
approach is also used to estimate the change in native vegetation quality or extent 
resulting from landholder actions. 
Landholder actions in the pilot were limited to indigenous revegetation and improved 
remnant native vegetation management. In the future other on-farm management 
actions could be evaluated but further research is required to determine appropriate 
monitoring and enforcement strategies.  
Revegetation requires the establishment of indigenous species in formerly cleared 
areas to achieve a required target based on the modelled pre-1750 vegetation types for 
the site.  Remnant native vegetation management involves landholder commitments 
that improve the vegetation quality of the site as assessed in comparison to a 
‘benchmark’ that represents the average characteristics of a mature and apparently 
long-undisturbed state for the same vegetation type (Parkes et al. 2003, DSE 2004). 
The following table summarises the outcomes used in the pilot. 
Table 3. Summary of outcomes, service and significance 
Attribute  Change in level of service Desirable  change  Significance 
Terrestrial 
Biodiversity 
∆ habitat score 
(habitat maintained or 
improved per ha) 
Increase Biodiversity  conservation 
significance , threatened 
species conservation status, 




∆ water “quality” 
(tonnes of soil / ha to stream) 
∆ water quantity 
(mm of water / ha to stream) 
Decrease   (not applied in pilot) 
Saline land area  ∆ saline land 
(ha with groundwater < 2m) 
Decrease  can discriminate - but given 
equal weighting in pilot  
Carbon 
sequestration 
∆ carbon sequestered 
(tonnes / ha) 
Increase n/a 
4.2.1  Aggregate Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) 
To choose successful bids, the following method was used.  For each environmental 
outcome, the difference between the estimated pre-1750 level and the estimated 
current stock was calculated.  The raw outcome score for an outcome in a bid was 
then divided by the difference between pre-1750 and current stock levels to produce a 
percentage movement towards pre-1750 conditions for each outcome.  The percentage 
movement or adjusted scores for each outcome produced by a bid were then added to 
produce a total score, which when divided by the cost of the bid produced the ‘total 
value for money’ produced by that bid. Choosing those bids that provide the best 
value for money, or the greatest total adjusted score per dollar, until the budget is 
exhausted ensures that it is not possible to get more of one good without giving up 
some of another.   26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 




By using this method the department is effectively indicating that it is indifferent 
between a score that reflects a 1% movement towards pre-1750 levels for biodiversity 
and a score that reflects a 1% movement towards pre-1750 levels of aquatic function. 
For each of the environmental outcomes the pre-1750 and current stock of each 
outcome was calculated under steady state conditions for the catchment (see Table 4 
below).  
Table 4. Pre-1750 and current environment outcome stocks 







1 418,140  19,081  -  399,059 
Saline land area (<2m)  83,702  127,153  + 43,451 
Aquatic function  27,070  94,320  + 67,250 
   1) Applied to both remnant management and revegetation 
For each site assessed in the auction equation (1) was applied to determine the 
aggregate score. 



















EBI     (ii) 
where:  
Ai, Si and Bi are the aquatic, saline and biodiversity outcomes respectively for site i 
DA, DS and DB are the respective aquatic, saline and biodiversity differences from Table 4 
above 
In effect the above equation calculates the total percentage movement towards pre-
1750 conditions for each of the environmental outcomes.  
Carbon sequestration is dealt with as a market good and landholders are paid 
separately for each unit produced. As previously discussed, when bidding landholders 
understand that if their bid was accepted using the above scoring method, for each 
tonne of carbon sequestered they would receive a payment of $12, paid for by a third 
party. Landholders are not obliged to sell their carbon for $12/t they can elect to retain 
the rights for use later. 
The selection of bids is based only on the EBI and the cost of the bid, farmers adjust 
their bid given the knowledge they will receive carbon payments if their bid is 
accepted. The simplicity and transparency of this option allows reflection on the 
result, facilitates feedback from stakeholders on the goods chosen and the trade-offs 
made and other lessons that will help inform and refine the method of dealing with 
demand to more accurately capture society’s preferences. 26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 






The following table outlines the steps taken to implement pilot. Each step required a 
different level and type of communication ranging from very simple to intensive and 
complex. 
Table 5 . Pilot Implementation Steps 
1.  Expressions of interest – landholders located in project areas register an expression of interest 
through their EcoTender field officer. 
2.  Site Assessments – the EcoTender field officer arranges a site visit with each registered 
landholder. The field officer assesses the site and advises the landholder on the significance of the 
site from a range of environmental perspectives, and identifies potential native vegetation 
management and revegetation options for consideration by the landholder.  
3.  Development of draft management plans – landholders identify the actions they are prepared to 
undertake and the field officer prepares a management plan as the basis for a bid. 
4.  Submission of bids –landholders submit a sealed bid that nominates the amount of payment being 
sought by them to undertake the agreed management plan. 
5.  Bid Assessment – all bids are assessed objectively on the basis of: 
•  the estimated change in the on and off-site environmental outcomes (the amount of change in 
environmental outcome); 
•  the value of the assets affected by these changes (significance); 
•  dollar cost (price determined by the landholder). 
Funds are then be allocated on the basis of ‘best-value for money’. 
6.  Management agreements – successful bidders are able to sign final agreements based on the 
previously agreed draft management plan (from 3 above). 
7.  Reporting and Payments – periodic payments and reporting occur as specified in the agreement. 
4.3.1 Site  assessments  and application of CMF 
The site assessment step was critical in communicating the ‘whole of catchment’ view 
to each participating landholder and providing a relative view of where their property 
was placed with respect to the various environmental outcomes being sought. This 
was new information that had not been previously communicated to any landholders 
in the pilot areas and required the field officers to fully understand the outputs 
generated from the CMF and to be able communicate this in a simple way. 
As such, field officers needed training to understand the principles of the CMF and 
how to use the purpose-built interface designed to access the CMF for scoring. It was 
important the field officers had a sound appreciation of the CMF in order to address 
questions posed by landholders about the scoring methodology. The officers needed 
to feel comfortable with the concept of modelling landscape processes so that during 
the site visit landholders were left feeling confident in the scoring process and felt the 
agency was using a reliable methodology.  
Given the spatial nature of the pilot, a system was devised whereby field officers 
entered GPS data into a hand held device (IPAQ, similar to a personal organiser with 
a GPS locater attached), which was later down-loaded for use in the CMF. 26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 




For each site, field officers used the IPAQ to collect and store GPS coordinates, 
record current landuse or EVC, and record detailed information about the current 
condition of the EVC (tree density, logs present, weeds, pests, etc). This was followed 
by a discussion with the landholders about actions (for inclusion in the management 
plans) that could be undertaken to provide environmental outcomes. Field officers 
would indicate to each landholder the type of actions best suited for the site and the 
minimum standards required.  
The field officer then used the interface to down-load the information from the IPAQ 
to the CMF. They used the interface to validate data already within the model (e.g. 
ground truth land use data) and then calculate the environmental outcomes for the site. 
Additional utilities made available to the field officer in the interface included: 
recording system for weed and pest control; selection of observed threatened flora and 
fauna; copy/paste sites and zones; modify site way points; recording fencing location 
and length; edit habitat scoring and print management plans and bids sheets for each 
site. All information entered by the officers was recorded in a single file that could be 
readily e-mailed (via dial in, the files average 4KB) to others for validation etc.  
In addition to the above information sheets, the field officers also had access to colour 
“maps” that spatially represented the catchment view for each of the four 
environmental outcomes being sought on a scale from low to high (see Appendix II 
for example of aquatic function). These catchment views were produced to assist 
landholders in understanding the idea that environmental outcomes arising from 
landuse change are spatially variable. They were also designed to provide landholders 
with a simple relative view of where their property was placed in a catchment 
environmental outcome context.. 
5 Results 
The pilot called for expressions of interest from May 2005 and completed site 
assessments in late October 2005. 84 sites were assessed on a total of 40 farms. 50 
bids were submitted from 21 farms. The total value of these bids was $835,000.  
The following notes characterise the bids: 
-  46% of the bids were revegetation 
-  the total revegetation bids resulted in an estimated 21,000 tonnes of sequestered 
carbon 
-  72% of the bids produced two or more environmental outcomes 
-  All bids provided a biodiversity benefit, 72% provided an aquatic function benefit 
while only 8% provided any salinity benefits.  
A tender evaluation panel was appointed to open the bids and enter them into an 
electronic database. Once all the bids were opened, the cost per environmental benefit 
was calculated for each bid and the bids were ranked on the basis of ‘best value for 
money’, lowest cost per unit benefit to highest. Bids were then selected from lowest 
cost up until the $500,000 budget was exhausted. Figure 4 below shows the supply 
curve for the all submitted bids. 26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 





































Last Accepted Bid ($14.81, 358,199)
 
Figure 4. EcoTender Supply Curve 
The supply curve shows the rising price of environmental benefits from landholders 
that bid. The supply curve in Figure 4 does not show the full price range on the y-axis, 
the price went up to $1,500 per unit environmental benefit. The last bid accepted 
within the budget ($500,000) cost $14.81 per unit environmental benefit.  
The following points characterise the accepted bids: 
-  31 bids accepted (62% of total) 
-  successful bids covered 259 ha (revegetation 76 ha, native vegetation management 
183 ha). This was 70% of the total area offered (353 ha).  
-  10,078 tonnes of carbon of which 8,087 tonnes were sold by the landholders to a 
third party, the remaining carbon was retained by landholders.   
-  of the bids selected 97% of them had two or more environmental outcomes 
Only a few bids provided a salinity benefit, which can be explained somewhat by the 
size and location of the sites. The largest site was 45 ha which is sufficient to provide 
salinity benefits, however it was located in an area of the catchment that is not 
amendable to providing salinity benefits. Other smaller sites were located in areas of 
the catchment amenable to providing salinity benefits, but they were not large enough. 
6 Concluding  Comments 
The EcoTender approach piloted an auction to procure environmental outcomes as 
part of a larger market based instruments program. EcoTender represents a significant 
advance towards implementing a comprehensive market-based approach to managing 
environmental problems. The design of a successful auction requires implementation 
of an auction mechanism that can process complex natural resource information 
combined with information elicited from landholders to ensure cost effective use of 
government funds. 26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 




If correctly applied auctions can help to overcome common problems involving 
asymmetric information – where landholders have information about the cost of 
undertaking an action but this information is hidden from the agency that is providing 
the funds. The agency needs both cost information from landholders and information 
linking landholder actions to environmental outcomes (missing information), to 
allocate funds cost effectively.  
This is the first time a market-based policy has been fully integrated from desk to field 
with a biophysical simulation model, the CMF, for the purchase of multiple outcomes. 
Economic theory demands a non-point production function to solve the missing 
information problem. This CMF solves the missing information problem of linking 
paddock scale landuse and management to catchment scale environmental outcomes.  
The CMF has incorporated biophysical processes to account for soil erosion, water, 
carbon and saline land to estimate environmental outcomes. Further, biodiversity 
algorithms have been incorporated which evaluate the current location of native 
vegetation and biodiversity landscape preference which assesses the future spatial 
needs of key mobile fauna species. The CMF is the only framework (the authors are 
aware of) that has brought together both biophysical and eco-system information.  
The framework has demonstrated the importance of joint production in environmental 
outcomes and the heterogenous nature of the landscape in terms of environmental 
outcomes at the farm level. 
Many authors have argued for greater disaggregation of the environmental production 
function (Babcock et al 1997, Shortle and Dunn 1986, Just and Antle 1990).  This 
enables better targeting and hence improved policy efficiency.  However, the costs of 
highly disaggregated spatial simulation models have been seen as prohibitive. The 
authors of this paper acknowledge the potentially large upfront investment costs 
required to build such models. However, this cost needs to be amortised of the life of 
the technology and the variable costs considered when assessing their ongoing use. 
Policy makers need to take into consideration the probability of needing this type of 
information for this program or others in the future.  Clearly, the CMF has enabled 
this pilot and other policy approaches to better target landuse change and maximise 
the environmental outcomes for a given budget.   
The CMF has significantly reduced the transaction costs associated with accurately 
determining environmental outcomes for any site within the landscape. The CMF can 
be readily calibrated to any catchment providing there is sufficient data for 
calibration. Further, the framework can be readily updated as new data becomes 
available. 
If for some reason there is uncertainty as to whether the transaction costs are lower 
when the CMF is used one only needs to then consider the full cost of implementing 
the program and the benefits the program provides. As far as the authors are aware the 
benefit cost ratio of EcoTender is greater than that of any other environmental 
program implemented at the farm scale (the authors are not aware of any other 
program that can provide such a benefit cost ratio, making the conclusion somewhat 
easy).  
During the development of the CMF the possibility that policy may change resolution 
and there are budget constraints associated with applying policy solution to 
environmental outcomes was taken into account. We believe the appropriate 26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 




economic and scientific tradeoffs have been made – the cost is not too high for the 
additional benefit derived by using the approach and the science can be updated very 
readily as it becomes available or is updated. The CMF can be used to prioritise areas 
of investment to improve the accuracy of the model in order to have more confidence 
in its predicted outcomes – this aids investment in science. The approach is fully 
transferable to other regions within Australia and overseas. The CMF requires 
standard general information such as soil type, slope, elevation and landuse all of 
which are important for other policy requirements.  
6.1 Further  Research 
The following areas warrant further research if the CMF or like approach is to be 
applied in the future: 
•  Demand side preferences and the assessment diminishing marginal product when 
developing metrics and assigning preferences.  
•  Bids are currently assessed independently of one another. However, a combination 
of bids may have a greater impact than the sum of them alone. Combinatorial 
approaches to bid selection warrant further investigation. 
•  The application of the CMF to other spatially explicit resource allocation 
problems including biosecurity and optimal ecological pathways. 
•  The CMF is a highly disaggregated spatial simulation model.  There is an 
optimum in terms of the trade off that occurs disaggregation, better environmental 
outcomes and cost. More experimentation and research is required to find that 
point where the marginal cost of further disaggregation is balanced with the 
marginal benefit.   26th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists 
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